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“I realised it weren’t about spending the money. It’s about doing something together:” The role 1 




Community initiatives aiming to reduce health inequalities are increasingly common in health pol-6 
icy.  Though diverse many such initiatives aim to support residents of disadvantaged places to ex-7 
ercise greater collective control over decisions/actions that affect their lives - which research sug-8 
gests is an important determinant of health – and some seek to achieve this by giving residents 9 
control over a budget.  Informed by theoretical work in which community capabilities for collec-10 
tive control are conceptualised as different forms of power, and applying a relational lens, this 11 
paper presents findings on the potential role of money as a mechanism to enhance these capabili-12 
ties from an on-going evaluation of a major place-based initiative being implemented in 150 13 
neighbourhoods across England:The Big Local (BL). The research involved semi-structured inter-14 
views with 116 diverse stakeholders, including residents and participant observation in a diverse 15 
sample of 10 BL areas.  We took a thematic constant comparative approach to analysis of data 16 
from across the sites. The findings suggest that the money enabled the development of capabili-17 
ties for collective control in these communities primarily by enhancing connectivity amongst resi-18 
dents  and with external stakeholders.  However, residents had to engage in significant ‘relational 19 
work’ to achieve these benefits and tensions around the money could hinder communities ‘power 20 
to act’. Greater social connectivity has been shown to directly affect individual and population 21 
health by increasing social cohesion and reducing loneliness.  Additionally, by supporting en-22 
hanced collective control by residents of these disadvantaged communities it has the potential to 23 
improve population health and reduce health inequalities.  24 
 25 







Community empowerment as a route to greater health equity is enshrined in foundational 31 
health promotion/public health statements (WHO 1997; WHO, 1986). Definitions vary but we 32 
define community empowerment as processes through which communities of interest or place 33 
develop the capabilities they need to exercise greater collective control over decisions and ac-34 
tions impacting on their lives and health. Initiatives aiming to enhance individual or community 35 
empowerment are supported by a growing body of research demonstrating that ‘control over 36 
one’s destiny’ (Syme, 1989) is a fundamental determinant of health, and lack of control could be 37 
a significant cause of health inequalities.  Community empowerment is thus now integral to the 38 
Global Sustainable Development Goals and many local, national and international strategies for 39 
social and health development (e.g. WHO EURO 2013, 2019; UN Economic and Social Council, 40 
2019; United Nations 2019).  41 
 42 
Local place-based initiatives designed to be ‘empowering’ are diverse but some seek to enhance 43 
collective control over decisions and actions by giving community members control over a budg-44 
et.  Informed by theoretical work in which community capabilities for collective control are con-45 
ceptualised as different forms of power - ‘power within; ‘power with’ and power to – this paper 46 
considers the role of money as a mechanism to enhance these capabilities presenting findings 47 
from an on-going evaluation of a major place-based initiative being implemented in 150 neigh-48 
bourhoods across England.  49 
 50 
The paper starts with a brief overview of research on the relationship beween collective control 51 
and health and on the role of money in community-based initiatives.  It then describes the Big 52 
Local initiative and the evaluation design and theoretical frameworks shaping the analysis.  The 53 
findings are then presented followed by a concluding discussion.  54 
 55 
Collective control as a determinant of health and wellbeing 56 
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Evidence is accumulating that collective control by communities over decisions and actions im-57 
pacting on their lives may be a fundamental determinant of population health.  Different path-58 
ways linking inequities in ‘control’ to inequities in health have been proposed (Whitehead et al., 59 
2016). At a community level, for example, living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods can produce a 60 
heightened sense of collective threat and powerlessness amongst residents; these, acting as 61 
chronic stressors, can lead to distress, manifested as anxiety, anger or depression – recognized 62 
as damaging to mental and physical health (Ross, 2011).   Obversely, the exercise of collective 63 
control could reduce the health impact of disadvantage if, for example, community action suc-64 
cessfully prevents the siting of a toxic waste facility or attracted resources that make the envi-65 
ronment safer (De Vos et al., 2009; Popay et al., 2007; Popay, 2010).  Additionally, experiential 66 
knowledge acquired by people living in difficult social and material conditions can help develop 67 
more acceptable, and therefore more effective, ways to address the risks to health they face 68 
(Wallerstein, 1992; 2002; Popay and Williams, 1996; Pickin et al., 2002; Morgan and Popay, 69 
2007; Popay, 2010; Whitehead et al., 2016).  Positive health effects from collective action may 70 
also arise indirectly if participation fosters a greater sense of connectedness, increased social 71 
support and reduced alienation within communities, which could lead to improved mental and 72 
physical health (Bernard et al., 2007; Popay, 2010; Oakley et al.,1996; Reblin & Uchino, 2008). 73 
Individuals who participate in collective action may also benefit from an improved sense of self-74 
efficacy, which research has linked to better health (Whitehead et al., 2014; Zimmerman and 75 
Rappaport, 1988).  Finally, involvement in collective action may lead to increased political under-76 
standing and engagement. This could potentially contribute to democratic renewal and increase 77 
public pressure on politicians to deliver more socially just, equitable policies that could in turn 78 
address the social determinants of health inequities.   79 
   80 
Research testing these pathways has produced a considerable volume of high-quality empirical 81 
evidence demonstrating that the level of control individuals have over personal life circumstanc-82 
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es is a significant determinant of their health outcomes (Bosma et al., 1997; Marmot et al., 1997; 83 
Marmot, 2005; Orton et al., 2019; Woodall et al., 2010).  Though more limited, empirical evi-84 
dence is also accumulating on the impact of enhanced control at the ‘collective’ or community 85 
level.  Studies consistently report stronger evidence of impacts on intermediate social determi-86 
nants of health and health equity than direct impacts on health (Laverack, 2006;  Popay et al., 87 
2007; Popay, 2010; Wallerstein, 2002, 2006; Whitehead et al., 2014; Whitehead et al., 2016). In 88 
their review, for example, Woodall and colleagues (2010) found evidence of impacts on social 89 
cohesion and trust, but little evidence of direct impacts on health and well-being outcomes at a 90 
community level.  The review by Whitehead et al. (2014) identified limited but relatively strong 91 
observational and ecological evidence linking increased collective control over decisions to bet-92 
ter health. Orton et al. (2016) also found limited but good quality RCT evidence on direct health 93 
benefits arising from micro-finance interventions that increased collective control amongst 94 
women in South Africa, Peru and Bangladesh.   95 
 96 
The research briefly reviewed above supports the argument that enabling disadvantaged com-97 
munities to gain  greater collective control over decisions/actions impacting on their lives could 98 
contribute to reducing health inequities.  However, there is limited understanding of how to de-99 
sign initiatives to successfully support the development of these capabilities. In this context 100 
many different ‘experiments’ are being implemented including initiatives in which money is a 101 
key element of the ‘theory of change’. These initiatives have primarily been implemented at the 102 
individual level as conditional cash transfers  (e.g. paying people to ensure children attend clinics 103 
and schools or as an incentive to stop smoking) but they can also be found in community and ur-104 
ban development initiatives (Rawlings et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 2015). For example, participa-105 
tory budgeting in the English area regeneration programme New Deal for Communities, provided 106 
opportunities for 39 disadvantaged communities to have a direct say on how significant amounts 107 




Initiatives that go further and aim to give communities full collective control over how money is 110 
spent to improve their neighbourhoods are rare, but a few are emerging. Notable in the UK are 111 
the Local Conversations programme delivered by the Peoples Health Trust and the Lottery funded 112 
Big Local programme. Through a health equity lens these latter developments pose an important 113 
question:  in what ways and through what pathways could the transfer of control over how mon-114 
ey is spent in disadvantaged communities  ‘work’ to enhance their collective control over deci-115 
sions and actions that have potential to positively impact on their lives and their health?   This 116 
paper addresses this question by exploring the role of money in the Big Local community empow-117 
erment initiative in England.  118 
 119 
Theoretical frameworks 120 
Two theoretical frameworks have informed the findings reported in this paper.  The first concerns 121 
the conceptualisation of the capabilities communities need to exercise collective control. In a pre-122 
vious paper from our evauation of BL we set out a detailed framework conceptualising these ca-123 
pabilities as different forms of power (Anon). This Emancipatory Power Framework (EPF) utilises 124 
the concepts of ‘Power Within’, ‘Power With’ and ‘Power To’ , which have their roots in feminist 125 
theory (Allen, 1998, 2011; Arendt, 1970; Rowlands, 1997; Starhawk, 1987). In our framework, the 126 
three concepts of power have been adapted from the individual level to the collective. Here, 127 
‘Power Within’ refers to collective capabilities internal to a community. ‘Power With’, refers to the 128 
power that emerges when a community acts with other agencies and/or communities in the pur-129 
suit of shared ends. ‘Power To’ refers to the exercise of collective control capabilities to achieve 130 
desired ends.  131 
 132 
Secondly, we drew on Somers’ work on relational settings and public narratives (1994) and on 133 
Zelizer’s concept of relational work (2012), to examine the  settings and relationships involved in 134 
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the development of capabilities for collective control in BL communities.  Somers (1994, p628) 135 
defines a relational setting as ‘a patterned matrix of institutional relationships among cultural, 136 
economic, social, and political practices’ and ‘public narratives’ as “those narratives attached to 137 
cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual… [they] range from the 138 
narratives of one's family, to those of the workplace (organizational myths), church, government, 139 
and nation” (1994, p619).  140 
 141 
This relational lens sharpened our focus on how the Big Local money triggered relationships in 142 
particular settings amongst residents and between residents and external institutions, how these 143 
relationships were negotiated, the meaning the money held in these relationships (including the 144 
influence of dominant public narratives/stories about previous experience of place-based 145 
interventions). Zelizer’s (2012), concept of ‘relational work’ helped to illuminate  how BL residents 146 
sought to ‘earmark’ money, to identify legitimate ways to use it, as they negotiated existing and 147 
new social relations.  148 
 149 
Intervention & Study Design  150 
The Big Local Initiative 151 
Big Local (BL) is a place-based programme in England, launched in 2012 for at least 10 years and 152 
funded by the National Lottery Community Fund. Overseen by a national not-for-profit organisa-153 
tion - Local Trust - the programme awarded 150 relatively disadvantaged neighbourhoods just 154 
over £1 million each, for residents to decide how to use the money to make the area “an even 155 
better place to live” (Local Trust 2018). The BL areas were selected on the basis that they had his-156 
torically ‘missed out’ on Lottery funding. They have considerable flexibility in the design and de-157 
livery of local programmes but they are all required to form a resident-led BL Partnership (initially 158 
some areas established a pre-partnership Steering Group of community stakeholders) to oversee 159 
the local programme, involve the wider community in developing and delivering the plan; and 160 
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review progress over time. Each BL area has professional support through a BL Representative 161 
(Rep) and had to identify a “Locally Trusted Organisation” (LTO) to manage the budget. Many BL 162 
Partnerships pay people to undertake specific tasks (e.g. run engagement events and/or manage 163 
projects). While not formally required to do so, the resident-led BL Partnerships can (and typically 164 
do) engage with local public, private and/or third sector agencies (e.g. National Health Service 165 
organisations and local government) to attain their goals (Local Trust 2018).   166 
 167 
The ANON Study  168 
The (ANON) study is a multi-site, mixed-methods longitudinal evaluation of BL being conducted by 169 
a collaboration of academics around England. It comprises three phases from 2013 to 2021. It is 170 
funded by the National Institute for Health Resarch and the first two phases were conducted 171 
within the (anonymized information).  172 
 173 
The findings reported here are based on qualitative data generated during phase 1 between 2013-174 
2015.  This phase aimed to: gain an in-depth understanding of early implementation of the local 175 
programmes; identify any impacts on the communites’ capabilities for collective control; and ex-176 
plore change processes associated with these.  Two waves of fieldwork were conducted over 12 177 
months in 10 areas across England, selected from the 150 BL areas to reflect diversity in geo-178 
graphical spread and local context. Key elements of the latter were population characteristics, 179 
urban/rural, contemporary socio-economic conditions and historical trajectory.  180 
 181 
The dataset across the ten field-sites included semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 116 182 
residents and other stakeholders (e.g. BL Reps, workers appointed by residents, officers/elected 183 
members from local authorities and staff of voluntary organisations). Initial interviews explored a 184 
priori issues, such as impetus for BL activities, as well as specific activities/incidents judged to 185 
have potential to illuminate the development of collective control amongst residents. Subsequent 186 
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interviews followed up significant issues emerging during earlier fieldwork . The interviews were 187 
audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Other data collection methods included: participatory 188 
activities (e.g.walkabouts guided by residents); observation of partnership meetings and informal 189 
conversations recorded in fieldnotes and documentary sources (BL Partnership minutes, website 190 
material).  A mixture of verbal and written informed consent was obtained for all fieldwork. Ethi-191 
cal approval was granted by Lancaster University Research Ethics Committee.  192 
 193 
Data analysis  194 
Interview transcripts were anonymised, entered into Nvivo 10 and thematically coded using a 195 
common framework for ease of retrieval and cross-referencing during more focussed analysis. 196 
Initial thematic analysis was ‘within site‘, followed by a comparative analysis across sites. The 197 
analysis and interpretation were based on a process of review, refinement and group discussion 198 
within the research team, with agreement being reached about a set of general propositions in 199 
relation to the cross-site data (Yin, 2009). Analytic memos also informed the process enabling re-200 
searchers to use the full range of data (Charmaz, 2006; Birks et al., 2008).  As key themes emerged 201 
the research team formed sub-groups to look in more detail at these.    202 
 203 
The ‘money’ sub-group applied a power lens and a relational lens to their analysis.   Once an initial 204 
“overall story” about the ‘role of the money’ had been developed AT re-read all the interview 205 
transcripts, to check the extent to which the ‘story’ was similar across all the fieldwork sites. The 206 
research team also re-visited observational data to increase the rigour of the “story”.   207 
 208 
Coded quotes in the Findings: fieldwork Areas: A1-A10; research method (‘Int’); participant role (R 209 
= resident; BLW = Worker employed by BL Partnership; BLR = Big Local Representative LGO= Local 210 
Government Officer; PM = Big Local Partnership Member; O= employee of other agencies; 211 






In the 10 fieldwork sites during these early years of the intervention the £1 million appeared to 216 
make a substantive contribution to the development of ‘power within’ these communities and 217 
to their capabilities to exercise “power with” others.    There were, however, situations in which 218 
the money constrained the development of these collective control capabilities and/or delayed 219 
residents’ ‘power to act’.  Across the sites it was apparent that residents had to engage in signifi-220 
cant relational work in order to achieve the benefits control over the money could engender.    221 
 222 
Money Contributing to the development of ‘power within’ and “power with” 223 
From an early stage the money operated as a catalyst for community participation: “We had that 224 
money upfront and that was a hook” (A10-int-LGO).  225 
 226 
The chance to control £1 million nurtured the development of power within these commnunities 227 
by increasing collective confidence in the communities’ power to spark change and the 228 
connections, skills and knowledge needed to do this. Community events (e.g. festivals and dog 229 
shows) built interest and increased knowledge about BL.  Connections were made between 230 
residents and local organizations – local authorities; schools and not-for-profit/community 231 
organisations to share ideas. The £1 million worked to “help move things along” (A2-int-BLR) 232 
prompting a “coming together and drawing up a vision” (A10-int-BLW). Community relationships 233 
were newly established and extended. In some areas the local Partnership emerged out of 234 
existing groups but in the majority the £1 million brought together a relatively ‘new’ group of 235 
residents to work together for the first time. On all the BL parternships the opportunity to have 236 
control over the money for local benefit gave residents a focus for change, and excited them to 237 
get involved. As one resident partnership member, a  local councilor, commented: “We just 238 
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talked to everyone… People were really energised by it, they thought: ‘Right, we’ve got this 239 
money, we can change this community’” (A6-int-RPM). 240 
 241 
In some areas control over how the money was to be spent was extended beyond the residents 242 
on the BL partnership: 243 
 244 
“We had a participatory budgeting event which captured people’s imagination… it also gave 245 
them [residents] an opportunity to come together and make really quite significant decisions 246 
about who got money and who didn’t.  So… the ball was completely in their court” (A10-int-247 
BLW). 248 
 249 
Significantly, there was widespread recognition that the £1million had more than monetary val-250 
ue; as this resident partnership member highlighted, it fostered connections and collective iden-251 
tity within BL communities: 252 
 253 
“To me BL isn’t about the money…it’s not about the million pound is it – it could be £10, 254 
whatever, it’s about getting the community involved and doing something together… I had a few 255 
ideas about what to spend it on but then I realised it weren’t about spending the money and 256 
that’s when my ideas started to change. And instead of voicing my ideas as mine – it were 257 
always about the village for me” (A8-int-RPM).  258 
 259 
From the beginning in all the areas local organisations in the public and not-for-profit sectors 260 
were attracted to the opportunities the £1million opened up.  As an organizational stakeholder 261 
on the steering group set up in one area before the resident led BL partnership was established 262 




“We got involved… as a key organisation in the community [the million] could be really useful… 265 
and of course it fits very much with what we want to do here… we want to connect with these 266 
people; we want to be part of the development of this part of town and this community”(A4-int-267 
O).   268 
 269 
In this context, the money operated as a mechanism for residents to begin to connect with local 270 
agencies and increased their capability to exercise Power With these agencies as equals. As this 271 
resident Partnership member explained when asked about the role of the money:  272 
 273 
 “It’s enormously important… it gives some level of credibility to what we’re doing…you can go 274 
to people and say ‘Will you sponsor this, will you support this?’ and they’ll go ‘Yes… what’s it all 275 
about?’ … ‘We’ve just got a million pounds worth of Lottery funding that has to be spent in the 276 
community.’ So they can see the benefit” (A10-int-RPM). 277 
 278 
Similarly, this paid worker described the assertive way in which their partnership approached 279 
discussions with other agencies: “We want to invest some money. Who else wants to do it with 280 
us?” (A10-int-BLW) 281 
 282 
Over time the £1 million provided opportunities for residents to further develop their ‘Power 283 
With’ by extending local connections with a wider range of organisations and in new ways (e.g. 284 
A2, A4, A7, A8, A9, A10).  As the money enhanced the perceived legitimacy of BL partnerships, 285 
Partnership meetings could be a forum to engage professionals, to deliver their plans. In several 286 
areas, professionals were ‘invited in’ to formally present to Partnerships, e.g. a builder for A8’s 287 




Through new connections BL residents also acquired new knowledge and skills.  As one Rep 290 
commented, the £1 million “facilitated” community members building their capacity and assets, 291 
strengths, and levering in, using that strength to bring in others” (A2-int-BLR). There were nu-292 
merous examples of BL partnerships leveraging in matched funding from external agencies 293 
across the areas (e.g. A1, A2, A5, A9, A10). These included Local Government providing profes-294 
sional support with BL Partnerships providing cash (e.g. A1, A10) and a local college in A7, match 295 
funding training courses.  296 
 297 
These alliances could shift perspectives on where leadership and control should lie: establishing 298 
new relationships and/or re-negotiating the balance of power in existing ones.  For example, as 299 
was highlighted in observational notes, in A1, funding for a multi-use games area had been sug-300 
gested during a pre-Big Local consultation between the local government and young people. The 301 
BL Partnership supported the project, contributing more than twice the funding, effectively 302 
transferring ownership from the Council to the community via the BL Partnership. Notable, was 303 
how the decision to make such a sizeable contribution helped the Partnership to realise that 304 
they could do ‘big things.’ Up until then, they'd been allocating funds to small projects and 305 
community events. This bigger venture released them from smaller initiatives.  As the resident 306 
chair of the BL Partnership commented: “A new play facility, a multi-games area, places for the 307 
kids to go, a complete thing, with some money from the local ward councillors, would be a great 308 
thing to do" (A1-int-RPM).  309 
 310 
There were instances, however, when geographical, cultural and/or social obstacles limited the 311 
ability of the money to catalyze new relationships.  In some instances physical boundaries inhib-312 
ited connections, such as where a main road effectively cut a BL area in two and some people did 313 
not identify as BL residents (e.g. A2, A10). In other cases Issues around identity operated as barri-314 
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ers to connectivity, when for example, some residents did not see themselves as part of a disad-315 
vantaged area (e.g. A1, A10) and hence did not see the money as ‘for them’.  316 
 317 
Tensions over money: constraints on collective control   318 
 319 
The growth of  ‘Power Within’ and ‘Power With’ in these communities was accompanied by chal-320 
lenges that required residents to engage in significant ‘relational work’ involving negotiated ef-321 
forts to establish and maintain new and changing relationships and to remove constraints on 322 
residents’ ability to work with other agencies.  These  challenges were seen in most areas and 323 
were associated with various factors.  324 
 325 
Debilitating public narratives: the history of ‘failed’ place-based initiatives   326 
Shared public narratives of an area shaped meanings around how far communities could have 327 
control of the £1 million. In particular, memories of previous money-based initiatives (e.g. A2, 328 
A4, A8) and pre-established alliances (e.g. A7, A9) influenced perceptions of BL and could 329 
provoke cynicism As one resident noted: “There’s money that comes and goes with all these 330 
other initiatives that have come and gone over the years” (A2-int-RPM). The BL rep for A4 331 
similarly reflected on how past failures manifested as current challenges to attempts to forge 332 
new relationships between residents and with outside agencies, which in turn influenced the 333 
level of enthusiasm and ultimately the pace of progress: 334 
 335 
 “It’s a lot of trying to build the trust locally… having failed so many times in the past and there is 336
a lot of apathy of ‘Oh we’ve heard it all before… and all the money disappeared’ so it’s getting 337 
over that” (A4-int-BLR).  338 
 339 
Money distracting from” genuine” community action  340 
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“It’s a distraction” (A6-int-O). Participants from several areas felt that the £1million risked 341 
distracting residents’ from the collective pursuit of common goals. Some paid workers discussed 342 
how framing the BL initiative as having £1 million to spend, undermined a community ethos: 343 
“Telling people [about] the £1 million … I’m not sure that’s a good strategy personally because 344 
it’s always this thing about money” (A8-int-BLW). Similarly, this Big Local Rep illustrates how, for 345 
some stakeholders, the emphasis on the money had led to a relative lack of focus on forming, 346 
developing and supporting effective community networks.  “A few people are saying to me 347 
money is almost a distraction… the million almost needs to be put aside for a bit… we need to 348 
look at the community first’” (A4-int-BLR). A view shared by this non-resident local government 349 
officer:   350 
 351 
“Although the money has brought them [community members] together it doesn’t necessarily 352 
mean it’s the right conduit to drive them [residents] forward together because, from my 353 
perspective, people have a different interest if there’s money on the table… sometimes that 354 
money is a driver when a group’s not quite ready for it, can sometimes take over what would 355 
naturally develop or expand within a group…” (A9-int-LGO) 356 
 357 
Though concerns about the potential distraction of the money was more likely to be expressed 358 
by non-residents, some residents who had been working to improve their neighbourhood prior 359 
to the arrival of BL felt the £1 million had undermined collective action: “the partnership… It’s 360 
not organic. It’s artificial… The million pounds is… a red herring…. preventing you doing what you 361 
can do” (A8-int-RPM). This resident, described effective, small scale community improvements 362 
pre-BL that were undertaken with very limited funding by skilled and experienced residents.  363 
Another resident in A3 contrasted BL with the community’s recent participation in the 364 
production of their Neighbourhood Plan noting work already done, which could continue 365 




Tensions over how the money should be used  368 
Differing geographies and diverging understandings about legitimate uses for the money could 369 
provoke disagreements and risk fragmenting social relationships amongst residents and with 370 
external agencies. In some BL areas (e.g. A2, A10) tensions arose when different sub-areas 371 
identified competing priorities. In another case, confusion about the boundary of the BL area, 372 
which had been extended from one housing estate to include a number of more affluent streets, 373 
caused disagreements about who had legitimate claims on the £1 million (A6). In other areas, 374 
some participants suggested that BL Partnership members were driven by personal interests or 375 
pet projects and questioned particular claims on the money:    376 
 377 
“There was always that tension...money to be used for… activities that were already started off, 378 
like the gardening club, the luncheon club. And they just saw it as a pot of money they might be 379 
able to draw on…” (A6-int-RLC).   380 
 381 
There were also different opinions in some areas about the legitimacy of investing money in 382 
and/or working with local businesses though many residents recognised that economic 383 
development was an important aim. For example, residents in A4 were initially very clear that 384 
local shopkeepers should not participate in the initiative, pushing them out of the Steering 385 
Group, although this position softened over time.   386 
 387 
Constraining residents’ ability to work with other agencies  388 
BL was implemented as the budgets of public and third sector agencies were being significantly 389 
cut by the policy of austerity introduced by central government after the 2008 financial crisis.  In 390 
this context, participants in all areas expressed some distrust of the motives of external agen-391 
cies. One BL rep for example, reported concerns that the million pounds was attracting some 392 
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parties “who were blatantly chasing the money” (A4-int-BLR). A Rep in another area expressed 393 
these concerns in vivid language: 394 
  395 
 “One of the things with Big Local nationally… is that: ‘Oh a million’. The predators move in. You 396 
know ‘Us’ in public services who are being cut to ribbons gosh we can have some of that. “Yeah 397 
we’ll deliver what you want but it’ll cost you £30,000 rather than £3,000” (A10-int-BLR). 398 
 399 
Uniformly, participants expressed a desire to honour one of the principles underpinning the BL 400 
initiative:  that the money should not replace local government funding responsibilities. As a BL 401 
workers managing community consultation noted: ”The responsibility for providing for young 402 
people and creating opportunities for them, fits squarely with the local authority and with em-403 
ployers and other organisations” (A1-int-BLW).  In some areas BL Partnerships sought to create 404 
distance from potential collaborators in order to protect their ‘ownership’ of the money. And in 405 
some areas (e.g A4) negative feelings about the local governments previous involvement in the 406 
area meant that initially at least there was almost no contact between the partnership and the 407 
local council. 408 
 409 
There was evidence that appeared to justify these fears. In A8, BL funds were used to support 410 
provision of a youth worker when redundancies happened in Local Government posts, whilst in 411 
A6 the BL Partnership was funding youth provision that had been cut. These circumstances could 412 
lead to a complete breakdown of relationships. For example, as reported in observational notes: 413 
the Partnership in A10 was negotiating with the local Council over a small disused green space. 414 
At an informal meeting, they were presented with an invoice for the cost of fencing the area that 415 
the residents had agreed to maintain in exchange for the Council ensuring it was safe for public 416 
use by fencing it. The residents declined to pay the invoice. The project was shelved and the 417 




Doing relational work: negotiating tensions and transforming relationships 420 
Tensions in relationships between groups of residents and with external organisations were 421 
evident in all 10 areas. However, as this resident illustrates, there was also a widespread 422 
recognition of the need for the relational work required in “establishing, maintaining, 423 
negotiating, transforming, interpersonal relations’ (Zelizer, 2012:149)  424 
 425 
“You’ve got to be cautious, and you’ve got to be accommodating.  But you sometimes don’t 426 
want to be.  But you have to work with people… We have had councilors [elected officials] 427 
attend meetings… it’s generally because they want to suggest where money could be used. And I 428 
always feel defensive straightaway.  But no, at the back of my heart I do know that yes, work 429 
sensibly and use funding properly” (A2-int-RPM).  430 
 431 
BL was seen by some to have the potential to mend fractured relationships deeply entrenched 432 
over many years in shared public narratives of a place. In A8, a mining community with a history 433 
of social cohesion and community activism, which had experienced high levels of job loss in 434 
recent decades, a representative from the Locally Trusted Organisation expressed the:  435 
 436 
“dis-engagement from decision-making over the years… [residents are] very skeptical that it (£1 437 
million) will just get hived off. And that is quite [strong] I think within an established community.  438 
The older established communities are sort of very difficult to break….Big Local’s an opportunity 439 
to change that …”(A8-int-BLW). 440 
 441 
Likewise, in A4, there were suggestions that BL could right the perceived wrongs of the past, by 442 
using the money to fund collaborative work between residents and local agencies. In this and 443 
other areas  the tensions provoked by the money and the subsequent relational work required to 444 
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resolve them, were seen as an almost inevitable part of the BL process. In A6, for example, a LGO 445 
reflected on potentially positive impacts of the tense relational dynamics triggered by the money: 446 
 447 
 “I was a bit worried about the conflict it was creating.  I didn’t think that was good for people’s 448 
health and wellbeing. And people feeling exasperated and walking out… I just worried about that 449 
from the community engagement perspective and the Council’s perspective. … But… maybe 450 
that’s a process they needed to go through… Because… it was very pioneering” (A6-int-LGO).   451 
 452 
Some local organisations also understood the need for relational work: to adopt different 453 
approaches to negotiate new relationships with BL communities.  In A6, for example, a youth 454 
charity worker described how his organisation found ways to resist being seen as ‘chasing the 455 
money’ when the award of one million pounds was announced and recognised the shift towards 456 
greater community control that the million offered: 457 
 458 
“We backed off a little bit… I’ve… re-engaged with it in the last six months… because… it was a 459 
bit like vultures around a carcass… a million pound… eyes light up...  So… we have to fund our 460 
work but we don’t want to be just like dipping into all different places just to get the money… we 461 
want to do things that are benefitting and empowering the community. Which is exactly what 462 
this is about” (A6-int-O).  463 
 464 
Relational work in BL Partnerships:  Delaying resident-led decisions and action  465 
BL Partnerships were the local governance space with final collective control of how  the £1 466 
million was spent.  This process required significant relational work amongst partnership 467 
members, a majority of whom were residents, as the money was ‘earmarked’ for what was 468 
considered legitimate purposes. Observations notes showed how, during meetings, all the 469 
Partnerships expressed a strong commitment to accountability and responsibility: to be seen to 470 
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be ‘doing the right thing’ with the money.  But ‘getting it right’ meant different things to 471 
different partnership members. These conflicting perspective were apparent in three areas in 472 
particular:  the governance of the money: the balance between immediate small spends and 473 
longer-term larger investment;  and the balance between direct and indirect benefits to the 474 
community. As we discuss below, navigating the complex terrain between divergent views in 475 
these three areas, involved considerable relational work which could make collective decision-476 
making processes lengthy, with many areas struggling to meet their initial spending timelines. 477 
 478 
Getting the governance right 479 
 480 
Participants from several areas described lengthy timeframes between announcement of the £1 481 
million and seeing impacts in their communities. Some areas established particularly transpar-482 
ent, but time-consuming processes to demonstrate legitimate decision-making (e.g. A4, A10). In 483 
A10 an audit group met regularly, discussed funding applications from community members and 484 
reported back to partnership meetings. Without consensus, community members could be re-485 
quested to submit an amended proposal.   486 
 487 
Less commonly, external governance procedures were perceived to create unnecessary delays, 488 
as one resident noted: 489 
 490 
“Every now and again… he (Rep) puts another obstacle in our way… rules and 491 
regulations…Sometimes it feels like you’ve got this money…  like a big carrot… and they keep 492 
moving it higher… and you have to… jump through that hoop… another hoop… He’s like St Peter. 493 
And the Big Local are like God…. Because he’s like their representative… we’ve been sitting on 494 




A lack of tangible signs that the money was being spent to benefit communities was a source of 497 
discontent amongst some residents prompting more relational work to manage expectations as 498 
this LGO worker highlighted:   499 
 500 
“It [BL] was sort of sold quite early on as: ‘Oh you’ve got the money you can do what you like.’ 501 
Well obviously you can’t, can you? And that can sometimes be a false expectation for people 502 
then I think, so you have to manage that” (A10-int-LGO). 503 
 504 
Getting the balance right: community benefits vis-a-vis spending wisely for sustainability 505 
In several areas agreement on specific spending was hard won, despite having broadly shared 506 
priority areas. Disagreements often reflected schisms between partnership members about 507 
spending approaches:  508 
 509 
“I have a number of plans that are costed and ready to go and in my view address the priorities 510 
that we identified with the consultation… that approach hasn’t gone down that well with some of 511 
the others… who want to spend a bit longer talking about things rather than doing anything… 512 
“(A3-int-RPM). 513 
 514 
In A4 the SG attempted to balance the need to be seen to be spending the money ‘wisely’, and 515 
the expectations of residents asking why the money was not being spent on tangible benefits. 516 
Hence they decided to spend on a high profile project for a ‘quick gain’; the painting of a mural 517 
on the side of the building where BL meetings took place. 518 
 519 
For most BL Partnerships working with external agencies (power with) was the key to 520 
“sustainable” spending: ”We’re not spending the money as quickly as probably expected and it’s 521 
because we’re looking for who else wants to work with us, who else wants to invest” (A10-int-522 
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BLW). But the relational work required to build and maintain optimum relationships with local 523 
agencies was time consuming. For example, one ex-chair of a partnership expressed 524 
ambivalence around working with the local Council to ensure long term gains but recognised the 525 
need to do so and highlighted communication as key: 526 
  527 
 “A million pounds is not a lot of money stretched over 10 years but if we know what the 528 
council’s plans are or we can have an influence on what plans the council put into place… then in 529 
terms of long term plans we might be able to achieve a lot more.  But at the same time also 530 
keeping in mind that we don’t want the council to think BL is going to replace anything that 531 
they’re going to withdraw. So, I think it’s so important to have the communication” (A6-int-532 
RPM). 533 
 534 
A participant from the same area highlighted how maximising impact was dependent on using 535 
the £1 million creatively on structues and processes that supported sustainability:  536 
 537 
“It’s not a lot of money… it’s got its own logic to it… you start something and then it creates 538 
more and more and more activity. Because a million pounds isn’t a lot, so it’s got to be about 539 
creating an ethos and a structure that allows things to keep going….” (A6-int-RLC).  540 
 541 
Getting the balance right: direct and indirect benefits  542 
There were mixed views about using some of the £1 million for day-to-day running of BL as op-543 
posed to projects with direct benefits for the community.  Some areas hired professional exper-544 
tise early, ensuring on-going support for their work  (e.g. A1, A7, A8, A9).  In A1 partnership mem-545 
bers saw specialist support as an investment and commissioned a community development or-546 
ganisation to help them design and deliver the initial community consultation; a youth work or-547 
ganisation to consult with young people and paid for a local government officer one day per week 548 
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to co-ordinate BL activities. In contrast, A5 were reluctant to finance anything not considered to 549 
be directly beneficial for the community, while in A10 resident members of the BL partnership 550 
volunteered to undertake everyday tasks and administrative duties as a cost saving exercise. 551 
However, this created problems. As one resident explained, she had left the partnership because 552 
their reluctance to pay for professional support had placed an unacceptable burden on volun-553 
teers. 554 
 555 
Over time more areas recognized that ‘buying-in’ professional help would extend administrative 556 
capacity, sustain day-to-day management and reduce the volunteering burden on residents (e.g. 557 
A2, A6, A7, A8, A10).  But employing workers brought its own challenges.  In A4, observations 558 
showed that the paid worker found it impossible to managing conflicting priorities amongst 559 
Steering Group and resigned. In general, areas appeared to be more likely to pay for support if 560 
expenditure was perceived as an investment and route to sustainability. This was very clearly ex-561 
pressed as a priority in some areas.  For example, as observational data showed, in A10 money 562 
was used to hire professionals to support residents (in the short term) as they gained experience 563 
and skills until they could run a job club, while also laying the groundwork to ensure the initiative 564 
lasted beyond the 10 years of funding.  565 
 566 
Discussion   567 
There is a long-standing debate globally regarding the relative merits of programmes that target 568 
resources at issues identified by funders (e.g. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer pro-569 
gramme) and those that give communities of interest and/or place some measure of control over 570 
how funds are spent to address local needs (e.g. the EU Commuity-led local development ap-571 
proach to fund allocation, 2018).  A recent review of health inequities in England (Marmot et .al. 572 
2020:10) concludes that when community approaches are empowering they can be ” central to 573 
efforts  to reduce health inequalities” increasing collective control which has a “positive influence 574 
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on health.” (2020:139).  However, evidence on the relative effectiveness of giving disadvantaged 575 
communities influence over how funds are to be invested to improve their lives has been argued 576 
to be “incomplete and results are open to interpretation” (Van Domelen, 2007, pii).  More recent-577 
ly, Reynolds (2015, p1) has shown there is considerable diversity in the type and extent of influ-578 
ence over resources communities are given in policy initiatives and there is very little evidence on 579 
the precise role of control over money in pathways to positive benefits.  580 
 581 
The findings reported here add to this limited evidence base illuminating how giving control over 582 
money to communities bearing the brunt of social inequities can operate to support the devel-583 
opment of the capabilities – understood as different forms of power – they require to exercise 584 
greater collective control over the social determinants of health and hence act as a potential 585 
mechanism to reduce health inequities. Our findings illustrate how the £1 million given to these 586 
10 Big Local areas acted as a catalyst in reshaping, rebalancing and extending relationships 587 
amongst residents and between residents and local agencies.   588 
 589 
As BL residents came together to identify common concerns and interests and share knowledge 590 
and skills, they gained greater confidence in their ability to act collectively so their ‘power within’ 591 
grew. Controlling how the  £1 million was to be spent also provided credibility to resident-led BL 592 
partnerships, enhancing their capability to development ‘power with’ others so  encouraging 593 
them to enter into, build on and negotiate relationships with external agencies, sometimes shift-594 
ing the power balance. In all areas growing power within and power with was associated with 595 
greater power to act, as residents became more assertive about taking control over how money 596 
was to be spent.    597 
 598 
As Reynolds and colleagues note, however: ‘community’ cannot be interpreted merely as a setting 599 
or recipient of such an intervention, but something constructed and negotiated through the flow 600 
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of money itself’ (Reynolds 2015, p2). The social connections the money drove amongst residents 601 
and with local agencies, and the positive impacts these had on BL communities ‘capabilities’ for 602 
collective control, did not come easily.   In all areas the £1million created significant tensions and 603 
BL residents had to engage in complex and often time consuming relational work to overcome 604 
these. Like Cornish and Ghosh (2007) revealed in their community led project, participating re-605 
quired work to change relationships between the community and more powerful external agen-606 
cies (p496).  Our findings highlight how BL  communities balanced caution with accommodation 607 
when negotiating with cash strapped local Councils; learnt to re-build trust in previously fractured 608 
relationships and attempted to re-calibrate well-established divisions of control and power. The 609 
role of trust in initiatives has been emphasised by others (Cornwall, 2008), holding symbolic value 610 
(Renedo & Marston, 2015) that influences the dynamics and outcomes of community participa-611 
tion. 612 
 613 
This relational work involved residents “establishing, maintaining, negotiating, transforming, and 614 
terminating interpersonal relations” (Zelizer, 2012,p149), to ensure that the money operated ef-615 
fectively.  Resonating with Campbell & Cornish (2010), who recognised relationship-building as 616 
key for community mobilisation, applying a relational lens to our data, revealed how the precise 617 
nature of relational work was shaped by diverse relational settings - the ’pattern of relationships 618 
among institutions, public narratives, and social practices (Somers, 1994,p626) – operating within 619 
and across these 10 areas. Key properties of these settings included the peculiarities of local geo-620 
graphical boundaries, the diversity of cultural understandings about legitimate uses for the mon-621 
ey, negative public narratives about previous community initiatives and significant reductions in 622 
public expenditure on local services resulting from central government’s austerity policies.   623 
 624 
Our findings also reveal ambivalence in the relational work undertaken. Residents saw opportuni-625 
ties to forge new relationships with external agencies albeit recognising the risks. On the one 626 
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hand, influenced by dominant public narratives,  they were wary of working with agencies that 627 
were perceived to have ‘behaved badly’ in the past or which they considered to be desperate for 628 
funding to continue to deliver services.  On the other hand residents recognized that working with 629 
others would ultimately increase the impact and sustainability of the £1 million. Negotiating new 630 
ways of working together meant residents risked being (or feeling) duped, and members of organ-631 
isations risked being seen as disingenuous ‘vultures’, attracted by the money. In this context, both 632 
residents and the staff of local organisations needed to negotiate to re-establish trust and (re) 633 
build viable and meaningful relationships in particular settings.   However, in some circumstances 634 
resident- led Partnerships felt they had to protect the money from other parties (e.g. Councils 635 
with cuts to budgets). In these situations  residents exercised their  ‘power to’ withdraw from ne-636 
gotiations - to shelve some projects (e.g. A10 failed negotiations for the green space) - giving up 637 
some opportunities to exercise ‘power with’ in the short term. 638 
 639 
Study Limitations 640 
The findings draw on data generated in a diversity sample of 10 Big Local areas over the first 641 
three years of this 10 + year initiative.  Our qualitative approach allowed a detailed investigation, 642 
across these areas, generating an extensive data-set that provided insights into the role of the 643 
money in these early stages of the programme. Our analytical strategy was to present the results 644 
across areas, while attending to any divergent themes by making constant comparisons between 645 
areas.   Though there were some differences associated with local context, the relational dynam-646 
ics identified were present in all ten areas.  We cannot say, at this stage, how ‘representative’ 647 
these areas are of all 150 BL neighbourhoods.  In later phases of the study we have conducted 648 
indepth fieldwork in an additional five areas and are looking explicitly for areas which diverge 649 
from the general patterns described here.  Additionally,  our research reports a snapshot early in 650 
a 10 year plus initiative. We are currently tracing the role of the money over the longer term to 651 
investigate how the relational dynamcis identified evolve over time  and how the role of the 652 
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money  changes.  As in all qualitative research, our engagement with participants in the field-653 
work sites and their knowledge of our research may have influenced responses during inter-654 
views; residents may have been sensitized to ‘progress’ relating to expenditure timelines;  other 655 
stakeholders may have prioritised the importance of collaborating with residents. The extensive 656 
observational work provides a measure of triangulation.     657 
 658 
Conclusion  659 
Community-led approaches to delivering social and/or health improvements are increasingly 660 
common in public health and in other policy fields.  Whilst few of these initiatives would give resi-661 
dents complete control over a substantial sum of money, as does the BL programme, many in-662 
volve the transfer to community members of greater collective influence over how resources or 663 
assets (financial and otherwise) are used to improve the conditions in which they live.  The find-664 
ings presented here have implications for the design of these initiatives that will help maximise 665 
the positive impact (and reduce the risk of negative impacts) of much more modest money/asset 666 
based community initiatives.  667 
 668 
Whilst we do not know whether the amount of money was significant, our findings suggest that 669 
giving communities ‘complete’ collective control budgets – no matter the size- could still be im-670 
pactful as positive benefits derive from both the symbolic and the purchasing value money.  They 671 
also point to the need for local initiatives to understand and plan for the scale and nature of the 672 
relational work involved in achieving positive benefits and how this may vary across the relational 673 
setting in which such initiatives are to be implemented - to the history of the area and previous 674 
area-based initiatives, to the nature and quality of existing relationships amongst residents and 675 
with external agencies as well as to the impact on these relationships of the wider political or pol-676 
icy agenda. Integrating these understandings into the design of community-based initiatives will 677 
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Supporting communities in gaining collective control has potential to reduce health inequities 
Disadvantaged communities with control over money, can develop ‘powers’ to improve where they 
live 
Communities in ‘total’ collective control of budgets could benefit in symbolic and monetary ways 
Local initiatives require varied relational work in order to achieve positive community benefits 
Local resident led initiatives need to recognize, the exercise of relational work in their design 
 
